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G.S.I.

EAST AFRICA COMMAND

PAMPHLET No. 1

NOTES FOR UNIT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

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G.S.I.

EAST AFRICA COMMAND

PAMPHLET No. 1

NOTES FOR UNIT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

APRIL, 1943

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PREFACE

This handbook does not replace the Manual of Military Intelligence in the Field (Pamphlet 1—4). It should be regarded primarily as a local supplement dealing with intelligence training and operational intelligence (I(a)) intended for the guidance of I.Os. with East African units. As however M.M.I. in the Field is not generally available, extracts from Pamphlets 2 and 3 have been included in Chapters VI and IX of this handbook so that it will provide a battalion intelligence officer with a complete manual for training his section and a general guide in the preparation of intelligence reports. Chapter II incorporates recent views of G.S.I., Middle East Forces, and G.S.I., Allied Land Forces, South-West Pacific.

OUTLINE ORGANISATION AND DUTIES OF GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE) H.Q. EAST AFRICA COMMAND

D.D.M.I.

General Direction, Organisation, Co-ordination, Liaison.

G.S.O. 1

Deputy to D.D.M.I., Direction of Administration of Command Intelligence Organisation, Comdt. East Africa Intelligence Corps, Interviews, S.S. Funds.

I(x)

Administration. Personnel. Transport. Returns. Registry. Pay and Allowances.

I(a)

1. Collection and collation of information on enemy, allied and neutral countries that might affect the Command, incl. information on:- Orders of Battle, Methods, Training, organisation and equipment of armed forces, Economic and Political affairs, Topography.
2. Distribution of this information by means of:—
   Appreciations
   Intelligence Summaries
   Military Reviews
   Military Reports and Handbooks
   Air photographs.
3. Production of Military Reports and Handbooks on our own territories within the Command.
4. Command Intelligence Courses.
5. Liaison with Surveys.

I(b)

1. Security of Military Personnel, offices, establishments, Ls of C. incl. issue of Security instructions, posters etc.
2. Security and Political Intelligence on our **own** territories within, and where necessary outside, the Command, through the Combined Security Bureau (East Africa).
3. Coastal and Port Security.
4. Shipping Intelligence.
5. Counter espionage.
6. Counter sabotage.
7. Security Lists.
8. Control and general direction of the Command Security Wing.

I (c)

1. Military Censorship.
2. P.O.W. Censorship
3. O.E.T. Censorship.
4. Photographic Censorship.
5. Issue of Censor Stamps.

I (P)

1. Production of Propaganda and Information for our own troops by means of:—
   Newsheets
   Publications
   Films
   Photographs
   Posters
   Lectures
   Debates
   Material for the Press
2. Propaganda to P.O.W.
3. Press and Broadcasting Censorship.

PR (Public Relation)

1. Publicity.
2. Issue of communiques
3. Contacts with the Press.
4. Press conducting arrangements.
5. Liaison with Military (incl. Naval and R.A.F.) units etc. to test the efficacy of our propaganda to the Troops.
6. Liaison with Civil authorities to ensure that military propaganda is reaching the civilian population.
7. The fostering of close relations generally between soldier and civilian.
8. Tours of Command Mobile Propaganda Units.
9. Contact with Press etc of neighbouring territories.

Liaison with Principal Information Officer (Civil)

1 April, 1943.

CHAPTER I

OUTLINE ORGANISATION AND DUTIES OF GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE) H.Q., EAST AFRICA COMMAND

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1. Opposite is a diagram showing the outline organisation and duties of G.S. ("I") at H.Q., East Africa Command.

2. The work of the five main sub-divisions of Intelligence, as shown on this diagram, is always covered in lower formations although it may often be combined under one officer (e.g. the Bde. I.O.). Area or divisional headquarters is the lowest to which intelligence personnel are normally allotted to the separate sub-divisions.

3. However in battalions or equivalent units, in addition to the intelligence officer, an officer who should normally be the 2nd in Command, is detailed to perform the duties of Unit Security Officer. (See Pamphlet No. 2 "Notes For Security Officers".) Units also nominate an officer to act as Unit Information Officer (I(P) work): he may be the intelligence officer, the security officer, or any other officer the C.O. may detail. (See Pamphlet No. 3 "Notes For Unit Information Officers").

4. In addition, if the particular situation requires, specialist officers can be allotted to lower formations, even below division or area. These are provided by the East Africa Intelligence Corps which is under the control of D.D.M.I. at Command Headquarters. This Corps is a body of specialist intelligence officers, security sections, censorship sections and certain other intelligence units.

5. At a divisional headquarters there is also an air intelligence liaison officer and R.E. officers each responsible for intelligence for his own arm.

6. It is emphasised that there is no direct chain of command from the intelligence staffs of higher formations to those of lower formations. While intelligence staffs are the channels through which information is passed up and down, every intelligence officers, including those who may be attached from the Intelligence Corps, is a member of the staff of his formation or unit commander, and it is as such that he passes on information.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIELD

1. "Detailed, accurate and timely information about the enemy and the theatre of operations is essential to success in war". The acquisition and distribution of this information, the object of which is to ensure the most effective employment of our troops and the prevention of similar acquisition by the enemy, form the main duties of a military intelligence system.

2. One of the most important functions of Intelligence is to provide Commanders with information which will enable them to defeat their enemies with the minimum effort. In default of good information, unnecessary and uneconomical effort must be made or defeat must be risked, and the sum total of unnecessary effort throughout the many theatres of operations in which we are at present engaged would be enough, if properly directed, to enable us either to undertake more commitments or to fulfil existing commitments more quickly.

3. It is rarely that we shall be in such overwhelming strength that information about the enemy doesn't matter. It is therefore essential for Commanders to have information which will enable them to calculate closely what forces must be used in any theatre or in any operation; and as the resources to be used in any campaign must be based on the information about the enemy, so must the local engagements within that campaign in turn be based upon a proper knowledge of the problem facing the local Commander.

4. It follows that training, practice and genuine interest in the work of the Intelligence personnel of all units and formations is as necessary as the training of fighting troops and Services.

5. Without this training and practice, rumour will take the place of probability; a mass of unrelated and unchecked facts will appear in place of concise and accurate pictures. Most serious of all, the Intelligence Branch will fail to enable the Commander-in-Chief to use minimum force for any one operation thereby reducing the maximum number of tasks which he might have undertaken with the resources at his disposal.

HOW INTELLIGENCE WORKS.

6. It will be understood that the principal task of Intelligence is to provide the senior Commander in any theatre with as complete a picture as possible of his enemy. Only with this complete picture is it possible for him to plan economically and safely.

7. It is equally important in its degree for every local Commander in the theatre to have a complete picture of the enemy in his sector; and the combined pictures from the sectors are the most important contribution to the big picture which Intelligence at G.H.Q. tries to draw for the Higher Commander.

8. Intelligence at G.H.Q. has a number of sources of information which for various reasons are not available to lower formations and to units. It is therefore generally in a position to check, supplement and evaluate information coming from the forward areas. BUT, the importance of good information from the forward areas cannot be overestimated. It is, fundamentally, the basis of all knowledge about the enemy; and except in the most unusual circumstances the information available at G.H.Q. will be confirmatory only.

9. It therefore follows that if the information from the forward areas is not the very best that training and cooperation can produce, the whole Intelligence picture will not be the best.

10. Experience in this war shows that amongst the weaknesses of Intelligence Branch is that proper use has not geenerally been made of Intelligence personnel in the Field, and that on the whole the lower the formation or unit the less importance is attached to proper "I" working. A fundamental cause of this is a lack of understanding of the aims objects and scope of Intelligence and of the ways in which it can serve Commanders, Staffs, Services and the fighting troops themselves.

11. This is largely due to our peace-time system. In peace-time, Military Intelligence, in an active capacity, exists only at the War Office and in a few Commands ab-

road. Practice and training in Intelligence work is practically nonexistent. As a result, Intelligence work is regarded as a cloak-and-dagger business only to be undertaken by those who have no military ambition. As a result, when war comes, all too few officers know the functions of Military Intelligence in the Field; and this lack of understanding is a most serious handicap to those who are responsible for providing the various Commanders with that essential item, an accurate pcture of the enemy they are fighting.

12. There is no mystery about military intelligence; it is essential that all ranks should understand this, and that they should be taught particularly during training periods some of the general principles of Intelligence work. Thus they will know what is required; they will understand to what use the information they can provide will be put; and ultimately they will realise the value that they themselves gain from good Intelligence work—and that value is the saving of lives and material and changing battle from a gamble into a certainly.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

13. It is essential that unit and formation Intelligence Officers be encouraged to concentrate on their special work. They must not be taken, as is known to have been the case more than once, as odd job men or put on to other work.

14. A great deal depends on the personality as well as the ability of the unit Intelligence Officer. Brigade and Battalion I.O's play a lone hand and only efficient and strong-minded officers can ensure recognition of the importance of their duties and that the necessary weight is given to their opinions. In fast-moving modern warfare, against enemies so ruthless and efficient as ours, good Intelligence work in the Field demands the very best type of officer and these officers must not only be allowed to concentrate on their special work, but given every practical encouragement to do so.

15. One of the most importance duties of forward Intelligence Officers during operations is the keeping of a constant check and careful analysis of enemy casualties in men and material. These figures form the basis for calculations

of the opposition which still confronts the fighting troops.

16. Reports received from all theatres of war indicate the necessity for :—

(a) Close personal touch between Intelligence Staffs of higher formations and those of subordinate formations.

(b) Battalion Intelligence Officers and Intelligence personnel to be well and favourably known to all Company officers and troops. This can be effected prior to operations by unit Intelligence Officers giving talks to the troops on various matters in respect to the collection of information, of security, and on subjects of general interest. **Also, it is important that commanders give their Intelligence officers priority lists of tasks required of them, and that at all times Intelligence Officers be kept in the operational picture.**

17. Under tropical conditions the personnel of brigade and battalion Intelligence Sections must if possible be in an even greater state of fitness than the troops, because very often, due to reconnaisance and guiding duties, they have to cover more ground than the troops themselves. Fatigue and the incessant wetness both through rain and sweat introduce many problems.

IDENTIFICATIONS.

18. The extreme importance of identifying enemy units operating in any area is still not generally appreciated. To obtain one single identification in a certain area may enable the Intelligence Staff of higher formations to complete an otherwise incomplete picture of the enemy and to reduce a guess as to the enemy's strength to fairly exact knowledge.

19. It happens time and again that units take prisoners but fail to send back immediate identifications. One case is known of in which a formation actually forbade their Intelligence Officer to send back identifications by "Immediate" signal. Immediately a prisoner is identified, or any identification of an enemy unit or formation is obtained, by whatever means, it MUST be sent back by "IMMEDIATE" signal. All liaison Officers should make a habit of asking for identifications.

20. It is the responsibility of Divisional "I" Staff to ensure that Brigade and Unit Intelligence Officers have sufficient Intelligence data and knowledge (i.e. enemy Order of Battle, the relevant handbooks and pamphlets on enemy forces, etc.) to enable them to identify enemy units.

21. In this connection, the importance of passing back information of any kind both quickly and automatically must be impressed on all ranks. It has been found that special Intelligence wireless links, when they can be made available, have greatly speeded up the passing of valuable information.

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

22. The importance of systematic search for and the sending back of all captured documents found cannot be overemphasised.

23. In towns and in captured enemy positions, the Field Security Service should be employed to collect and safeguard documents. Experience has shown that documents sent back unaccompanied are almost invariably pilfered by souvenir hunters. Documents should therefore be sent back either securely tied up in sandbags or else in nailed boxes, using D.R.L.S., Liaison Officers, returning aircraft or any other safe means.

24. Personal documents must be removed from prisoners as soon as they are captured, care being taken to see that prisoners do not destroy papers. At the more exhaustive interrogations carried out further back, valuable information has often been extracted from a prisoner when the interrogator has been able to refer to a diary or other personal papers. Prisoners' documents should therefore accompany them back whenever possible and every effort should be made to ensure that they do NOT go astray.

25. All documents must be labelled showing when and where they were found. The ideal, where possible, is a plain white label with the address on the front and the time, date and place of finding on the back. For prisoners' personal papers, a coloured label should be used giving in addition the prisoner's name and unit. It is strongly recommended that adequate supplies of labels, string and sandbags should be provided to units in advance.

26. In general, forward units and formations should send documents back after no more than a hurried glance through them. At G.H.Q. there are excellent facilities for detailed examinations and results will probably appear more quickly than if examination is attempted under the difficult conditions of the actual Front.

ENEMY MATERIAL.

27. Early accurate and comprehensive checks of enemy material captured and destroyed are of the first importance to intelligence. These figures are worth a real effort to obtain since without them Intelligence Staffs are most seriously handicapped in their endeavours to calculate the opposition still confronting the fighting troops; and miscalculations cost lives.

28. It is impossible for Intelligence Sections, even with the assistance of F.S. Sections, to be responsible for the collection of all captured equipment. This is normally the responsibility of Salvage units, but it is essential that Intelligence personnel should be able to assess quickly the value of such material and realise the necessity for the prompt despatch to the rear of important material.

29. The ideal solution, where possible, is to send out Intelligence Officers to tour the battlefield to try and locate and identify enemy material. This does not, however, absolve formations and units from doing all they can to count and identify all enemy guns, A.F.Vs., etc., disposed of in their areas.

30. Small items of special interest, such as sights, compasses, range-finders and other optical and precision instruments should be sent back as soon as possible. Much valuable enemy equipment has been lost to Intelligence and to research through souvenir hunting and wanton destruction. This shows lack of realisation of the supreme importance of examination and salvage of captured war material, both that we may benefit by the actual use of captured material against the enemy and also by producing something better as a result of seeing what the enemy has got.

31. Wherever possible, in withdrawal, information as to dumps of our own material left in enemy territory should be sent back. This knowledge is of great importance in calculating enemy maintenance problems.

AIR.

32. In bush and jungle country a further responsibility of forward units is to report meteorological information for our aircraft. They must be able to judge height of clouds, the degree of visibility, and the value and vulnerability of targets both for bombing and ground straffing.

33. The whole supply problem in future operations will be closely associated with air co-operation and all troops need to become familiar with the requirements of our aircraft in respect to dropping areas and landing grounds.

(See also: East African Training Intelligence Pamphlet No. 3. Section 7. Notes on Main Lessons of Recent Operations in the Western Desert).

CHAPTER III

INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIELD

GENERAL.

1. The unit I.O's task remains the same in all operations:—

To keep his commanding officer informed of :

(i) The probable intentions, strength, and methods of the enemy and

(ii) The military resources of the unit's area of operations.

2. To do this the I.O. must keep a complete watch on the enemy's dispositions by :—

(i) Direct observation (O.P's, arranging and briefing patrols, use of scouts).

(ii) Study of air photos.

3. He must know thoroughly the strength, organisation, weapons, and tactics of the equivalent enemy formation likely to oppose him.

4. He must be a master of quick interrogation of P.W.

5. He must train himself to note and record all topographical details of the country in which he is operating. These can generally be brought under the four headings of :—

(i) Cover

(ii) Communications (Paths and M.T. routes).

(iii) Obstacles.

(iv) Water.

Further information of importance in an operations area is dealt with in Chapter IV.

6. He must be a master of map reading and the use of tactical signs.

7. His records must be concise and readily available.

ADVANCE.

8. The I.O. must be well forward in an advance. Jungle and bush country do not lend themselves to the establishment of Observation Posts. Deductions about the enemy's strength and organisation have to be made chiefly from observing his fire, the type of weapons used, and reactions of his forward troops if contact is made with them. This implies a thorough knowledge of enemy weapons and tactics.

9. Briefing patrols and collating patrol reports generally take up a good deal of the I.O's time. Patrols are used not only to locate the enemy, but also to locate tracks, guide parties of troops, to seek suitable supply-dropping areas for aircraft, and to find areas which can be used for advanced airfields. A comprehensive patrol map must be kept at H.Q.

10. Friendly civilians and natives who come into our hands during an advance should not be sent back until it is certain they can be of little use to us. They may not only be able to locate paths and act as guides but also make contact with natives behind the enemy lines.

11. Although contact must be maintained with coy. commanders, they should not be pestered at moments when they already have their hands full. When new maps are being issued is frequently the best opportunity of obtaining a more complete picture of the experiences of small units. The future map requirements must be closely watched so they can be met in good time.

12. If an I.O. has to go forward he should leave the most reliable man of his I-Section at H.Q. One other should accompany him, if possible an askari who is good at carry-

ing back verbal reports. The remainder of the I-Section should be observing the battle; in bush or thick country they should be paying particular attention to the flanks.

13. The ordinary askaris cannot be relied upon to observe all the security precautions of escorting back P.W. (i.e. Segregation of officers and men, watch that no documents are destroyed, etc.) I-Personnel should accompany any party of P.W. back to brigade headquarters, particularly if there are any important P.W., and see that the escort enforces these precautions.

DEFENCE.

14. In defence it becomes more important to know what is going on behind the enemy's forward posts. The Bn. I.O. should redouble his efforts to keep the enemy under observation and an O.P. log should record every detail (Routine of bringing up supplies and reliefs). Patrolling should be directed to maintaining identification of enemy units. Generally General Staff Intelligence (by the use of agents behind the enemy lines, radio interception, special methods, etc.) has a more important role to play in defence than in an advance when the I.O. of the forward unit is the basis for new intelligence.

15. Topography must be studied with an eye to possible enemy lines of approach and O.P.'s or listening posts arranged accordingly.

16. Shelling reports must be kept.

17. It is possible to maintain a more elaborate Enemy Order of Battle in defence (at Appendix IV will be found a more detailed form which is used by intelligence in higher formations).

18. I-personnel should be forward and observing: only one of the section need remain with the I-office.

WITHDRAWAL.

19. In a withdrawal the I.O. has to keep the enemy under observation until the last possible moment. At the same time he must draw up his I-arrangements for the new positions which it is proposed to occupy. This can best be done by dividing the I-section and sending some of the personnel back.

20. In thick country the enemy may try to give the impression that he is in much greater force than is actually the case by maintaining the maximum volume of fire, by the use of noise, fireworks, and other methods. Similar tactics may be used by small parties infiltrating on the flanks to make the withdrawing force think it is surrounded and cause panic and confusion. The enemy's fire should be carefully studied so that an accurate estimate of his strength can be drawn. I-personnel out on the flanks will be able to watch outflanking attempts. This means a high degree of training so that they will be able to move about singly in the bush and find their way back to their main body.

21. During withdrawal the I.O. must study the topography of the country from the point of view of possible enemy lines of advance and what obstacles exist or can be developed.

22. Every precaution should be taken to see that all documents and articles likely to be of value to enemy intelligence are removed or destroyed.

L. OF C. AND OCCUPATION DUTIES.

23. The information required is in the main that given in Chapter IV of this handbook.

24. The I.O. must see that his commander is supplied with all information affecting his defense or emergency plan so that it can be kept up to date and that he is warned of any developments which may necessitate calling a state of emergency. Continual liaison with military security and civil authorities is necessary.

25. When the I-Section is not training, it can be employed on military security duties.

(See also: East African Training Intelligence Pamphlet No. 4.
Section 13. Reporting of Information).

CHAPTER IV

LOCAL INFORMATION

GENERAL.

1. The collection and gathering of local information in tropical or semi-civilised countries, is a harder task than in Europe where such vital intelligence as location of water, state of roads, and economic resources is readily available. At the same time it is far more important since units operating in tropical countries, at considerable distances from their bases and with bad communications, have to live much more on the country and the success of any operation depends often upon local knowledge of tribes, and seasonal changes. Even large scale maps do not give the same detail as similar maps in Europe.

2. The violence of climatic changes in the tropics, local famines, tribal disputes, often mean that conditions change from year to year, and information, particularly topographical and economic, gets out of date very quickly. In our own or Allied territory where there is a permanent administration, these changes may have been recorded; in an advance into enemy territory, or territory recently occupied by the enemy, our previous knowledge of the country will probably need revision. The unit intelligence officer must watch for and report all local changes which are vital, not only for his own unit but for adjacent or following units.

SOURCES.

3. During static conditions in our own territories the best source of local information is the district commissioner. His district, however, may often be large and he may have no exact knowledge of the outlying parts so that the unit I.O. will have to find out for himself. D.Cs. are often sensitive to military intelligence personnel operating in their areas. Tact is therefore called for: on the other hand no I.O. should neglect to take steps to collect information which is necessary to his commanding officer purely for fear of giving offence.

4. In reoccupying territory previously held by the enemy, our forces are likely to be accompanied by political officers or administrators who may have previously functioned as part of the administration there. While they should be able to help in supplying local information, it is likely that conditions will have changed considerably during enemy occupation (notably in local tribal loyalties) and political officers may refer to conditions which in fact no longer exist.

5. The civil police are in much the same position as distict commissioners. They are the best sources of security intelligence in our own territory.

6. European settlers can generally give information on local economic and labour conditions. On other subjects their information usually requires checking against other sources.

7. Natives are one of the main sources of information. But their limitations and weaknesses should always be remembered. Primitive peoples are generally hazy on such matters as times, distances, and numbers. " Yesterday, the day before yesterday, and several days ago " are much the same to a native. He calculates distances rather on a basis of the effort required to cover them than in real terms of length. All bodies of men above 20 are usually referred to in terms of " hundreds " or " thousands." His love of exaggeration or dramatisation, and above all his desire to please his hearers are factors which must be recalled in estimating the value of his information. His tribal mentality and the possibility of personal issues entering into his story should be taken into account. But the primitive tribesman is a keen observer: interrogation should be confined to asking him what he can see with his own eyes. If his name and branch of his tribe are asked him first, it tends to make him more careful in his story. Pictures and diagrams drawn on the ground are still one of the best methods of getting exact information from him. Anything in the nature of a paid regular native informer should be avoided. The best informant is usually a notable or chief. The I.O. of any unit stationed in an area where there is no regular administrative officer should make a point of cultivating an acquaintance with a local notable who can be contacted frequently for local news. Anything

in the nature of dabbling in local politics should be avoided.

8. Our own askaris usually contrive to make fairly speedy contact with local populations in spite of language difficulties and local prejudices. Trained African I-personnel as well as the askaris' own officers can collect a good picture from our troops of:

(i) The general feelings of the local population to our forces.
(ii) Market gossip and rumours.

TYPES OF INFORMATION.

9. **Water:** This is important not only in arid or desert country but even in the wettest jungle, where much of the available water is unusable because of contamination. There need be no fear of reports on water being superfluous: confirmation that a water-hole still exists is just as important as the discovery of a new one. Reports should give the type of water source (river, pool, well, etc.) the degree of purity, the quantity, whether there is stock or game in the neighbourhood, proximity to native villages, and it should be classified as:

(i) Permanent
(ii) Semi-Permanent
(iii) Seasonal

Information about water is of paramount importance, and a determining factor in the planning and speed of an advance. It should be passed back speedily to all units including M.T. companies.

NOTE ON SEASONAL WATER IN E. AFRICA.

Seasonal water is, in addition to being obviously the most unreliable source of supply, at the same time one of the most valuable in the arid regions of the North, and some idea of how and when to find it is golden knowledge. Generally speaking the arid semi deserts, in many parts of which the rainfall does not exceed 5″ a year, receive one or two heavy storms which are sufficient to fill the numerous shallow " ballehs " or depressions where water readily accumulates. The bottoms of these depressions are usually lined with some form of clay so that although absorption is slow evaporation is fairly rapid. The chief drain on

these supplies is made by native herds. The policy of the nomad herdsman is to take his stock as far as possible from permanent water, and correspondingly the most used grazing areas, during the " wet " weather — to base himself on a " balleh " and to graze his stock from there, until, having exhausted the water supply, he moves on to another.

Such " ballehs " become rapidly fouled by cattle and camels and usually the water is unfit for human consumption within a few days of large herds using it. Treatment by boiling and precipitation of sediment with alum or epsom salts on the scale of 1 oz. to a 4 gallon tin usually makes such water usable unless stock has been there long. Evidence of the occurrence of these surface supplies is not far to seek. Vultures and kites, besides numerous species of smaller birds, signs of stock and game moving in a definite direction, besides the presence of herdsmen, invariably indicate the presence of water in what otherwise appears to be a completely dry area.

The numerous " tugs," ravines and sandy river beds which occur so frequently over a large part of EAST AFRICA are another potential source of supply — although the quantity may be small and its incidence problematical. The presence of an unusually green tree close to the " tug " bed usually denotes the presence of water. Small heaps of sand and shallow scoopings, made either by man or elephants, are another sign worth investigating. The depth at which water may be found obviously varies in each " tug," but generally, if water is to be had there will be indications in the nature of damp sand not deeper than 6 ft. Upstream of a noticeable rock ledge, which forms a catchment area, is a place worth trying, as is the inshore side of a prominent bend where heavy spates tend to deposit heavy minerals which help to hold water.

ROADS. (See Appendix "F").

10. Road reports require continual amendment. The passage of a heavy military convoy during heavy rain, to give one example, may render a road impassable for following light M.T. and this should be reported at once. Road reports should include information, where it can be

obtained, of the condition of the road at different seasons. Information on the availability of local road metal is important. River beds should be noted and whether they are fordable in wet weather. It is not enough to say the surface is earth: it should be stated whether it is red or black earth.

WEATHER.

11. As the chief factor in determining food supply, state of communications, and frequently health conditions, any change in weather should be reported. Rain, even slight showers, changes in temperature, local thunder conditions, dust storms, are all important and should be reported by speedy channels and to civil administration as well as to other military formations. In jungle the height of clouds should be frequently reported back to air formations.

FOOD RESOURCES.

12. The local food resources of any area and the willingness of the inhabitants to sell it are important for advancing forces. Numbers of natives along the roadside offering chickens, fruit, eggs, etc., for sale are not necessarily a sign that an abundant food supply is available. The true gauge will be the state of the regular markets as far as smaller produce is concerned: The main needs of an army are for meat and cereals and this information is best obtained from chiefs and village headmen. A misleading report on local food resources might result in an army buying up food stocks needed by the local population with the result that food would have to be brought in to make up for this at a later date.

STATE OF CROPS.

13. Condition of crops deserves special attention. The progress of cultivation and state of planting indicate what will be the food situation in the near future.

PRESENCE OF PESTS AND VERMIN.

14. Locust swarms, plagues of rats, should be reported at once. Where certain districts are known to be infested by ticks, lice, snakes, etc., this should also be noted.

BILLETS AND CAMPS.

15. An I.O. should develop the habit of recording automatically as he sees them, good camp sites, European buildings and sheds, available materials for bivouacs.

LOCAL DISEASES AND EPIDEMICS.

16. Under this heading also come the incidence of malaria and V.D. in a district. The presence of pests may often be an indication of an epidemic. Watch for abandoned villages or fallen-in huts.

POLITICAL.

17. Tribal histories and distinctions are often the key to the attitude that the local population may adopt towards our own forces and also to the enemy. If one tribe supports the enemy, its chief rival may choose to ally itself with us and vice-versa. Some tribes may acquire a reputation for treachery, others for loyalty towards their allies. Information about tribal history, religion and superstitions, names of chiefs, family rivalries, and fighting qualities is all of value. Local festivals, seasonal customs and migrations may often affect the security situation in an area where the unit is stationed. The susceptibilities of the local population vis-a-vis European and African troops must also be studied.

SECURITY.

18. Measures for the security of our own troops can often be taken well in advance as a result of information collected under 17. Information about disloyal or disaffected communities should be passed to security officers and a watch kept on native drinkshops where askaris gather. Attempts to entice askaris into forbidden areas, activities of inquistive strangers and town gossips, new arrivals and travellers without any apparent legitimate business, should be watched. An I.O. who has trained I-personnel active in the area where the unit is operating and who has acquired reliable acquaintances among local notables should have little difficulty in spotting any suspicious developments. These should then be reported for the information of Field Security.

RUMOURS.

19. These may sometimes be deliberately started by enemy agents and should be carefully studied as they may give a clue to enemy movements and intentions not only in one's own area but in neighbouring districts.

CLIMATIC AND SEASONAL CHANGES.

20. Living closer to nature than is the case with Europeans, primitive peoples are more affected by changes in climatic conditions. A peaceful tribe may become affected by war spirit at certain times of the year. Migrations may start as a result of a lack of rain. Any evidence of major climatic cycles should, therefore, be watched for. Inquiry should also be made well in advance as to how roads, rivers, wells, etc., are affected by such cycles. Native folklore is often a good clue to this. Where civil records are available they should be referred to.

AMENDMENT AND CORRECTION OF MAPS.

21. Even the best map needs correction and bringing up to date. Intelligence officers should note any errors on maps such as inaccurate distances, wrong location of villages, bridges, defiles, etc. Cut-down forests, new clearings, former grass land now under cultivation, and vice-versa, new tracks, old roads fallen into disuse, should be reported back to Intelligence at higher formation so that the Survey Directorate can make the necessary amendments. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the smallest error or fresh detail should be reported. The commander of a higher formation may be entirely dependent on a map when making his plan and unreported error or lack of data may have serious consequences on the success of the operation.

22. New map data may be also obtained from captured documents and maps. The main types of material which are of value to the Survey Directorate, are:—

(i) **Large Scale Maps** — showing physical features, both natural, and developed, of a particular area.

(ii) **Topographical Maps** — defined as maps giving a conventionalised picture of the country, generally based on ground or air surveys.

(iii) **Small Scale Maps.**—Maps giving a general picture and giving such information as relative importance of towns etc. Features generalised and often incomplete through lack of necessary information.

(iv) **Charts** of varying scales showing all sea and coastal features, plans of harbours, etc.

(v) **Communications Maps.** — Road and/or Railway maps showing principal centres of communication, mileages, aerodromes, telephone lines, etc.

(vi) **Explorers' Route Maps and Reconnaissance Reports.**—These may often be only rough compass traverses with brief notes about the nature of the country traversed, supplemented by photographs.

(vii) **Engineers' Plans** of hydro-electric schemes, land reclamation, road and railway projects, and the carrying capacity of bridges, tunnels, etc.

(viii) **Descriptive Material:**

(a) Tourist Guide books which may include not only descriptions of certain towns, villages, tracts of country, roads, railways, factories, industries but may also contain town plans and maps.

(b) Maps belonging to the local Administration probably marked up with recent detail.

(c) Picture post cards showing beaches, piers, harbour equipment, etc.

(d) Route lists, road books, railway time tables, river steamer time tables, air services, descriptions of canals, prospectus of electric power or telegraph companies, departmental reports, etc., may all contain an immense amount of useful information which can be incorporated in maps.

(ix) **Geographical Articles** in text books or magazines often illustrated by diagramatic maps.

(x) **Military Intelligence Summaries** giving information about recent developments the enemy has made behind his lines, e.g., construction of new roads, bridges, aerodromes, landing grounds, etc.

(xi) **Air Photographs, Obliques and Verticals.**

23. Similarly maps and documents about our own territory should also be gathered whenever the opportunity presents itself. Where it is impracticable to submit the original material, the additional information or corrections and amendments resulting therefrom should be made by hand on existing official maps and these sent back to Survey Directorate.

24. The following report has been received from the South West Pacific war zone:

"Maps and sketches were a constant and most difficult responsibility of Intelligence Sections. Few maps were available, and those that were issued were very incomplete. It became the job of Intelligence Sections to correct provisional editions of maps and to collect topographical material for Survey Sections. A ready familiarity with airplane photographs was essential so that information which was contained could be quickly put to use. It is essential to be able to determine quickly the scale of a photograph and to be able to grid it. Intelligence Officers and men were often required to make a quick appreciation of the country ahead and produce a reasonably accurate sketch of some section of it."

25. At Appendix "I" will be found hints on the drawing of maps, plans, and diagrams for eventual reproduction by the Survey Service.

(See also: East African Training Intelligence Pamphlet No. 3. Section 9. Study of Ground).

CHAPTER V

SOME NOTES ON THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

GENERAL.

1. Whatever experience an I.O. may have had in the handling of, and the extraction of information from, German, Italian or Vichy French P.Ws., it must be borne in mind that the Japanese must be approached with the utmost care and from an entirely different angle.

The Japanese soldier must be treated at all times as an uncivilized being whose reactions are entirely unpredictable: his outlook on life has developed a fanaticism of a most violent form.

2. Troops should be trained at every opportunity in the handling of Japanese and given all possible information likely to help them in successfully procuring Japanese P.W. Experience to date has shown that while it has been extremely difficult to get a Japanese to surrender and in many cases has proved impossible, when they have been taken, their security on the whole is not good and they talk as freely as their limited knowledge of their own forces will allow.

3. Information received as to identities, numbers and types of weapons, etc., should be checked as thoroughly as possible and when possible other ranks instructed how to get accurate information. The Japanese has so far applied deception in all his moves, in some cases so well that our Intelligence has sometimes been wide of the mark.

ASSESSMENT OF NUMBERS.

4. The Japanese have, so far, very successfully gone to great pains to give the impression that their forces are much larger than they really are. This has sometimes been achieved in the most simple manner. A platoon will advance with everyone yelling and shouting while grenade dischargers and fire crackers operating from the rear give the impression of overwhelming fire power.

Both H.M.G. and L.M.G. positions are frequently changed, in some cases well sighted M.G. positions have been changed three times during the space of eight hours. The result has been that reports are sent back of the existence of a force considerably in excess of the real number, while points have been earmarked as free from gun positions when the reverse has been the case. Extremely heavy, blind, and wild shooting with rifles, M.Gs. grenade dischargers and mortar guns is another ruse adopted.

USE OF LANGUAGES.

5. I.Os. must impress upon all ranks, particularly Colonial troops, the importance of not acting upon commands or instructions made verbally in action unless they are certain of the identity of the person giving them. In Java, a very well defended locality complete with wire and listening posts, was reduced in fifteen minutes by the Japanese due entirely to the fact that the enemy had silently approached the perimeter of the defences and in some cases cut the wire and got to within a few feet of a commander's post or an M.G. position and then called out in Dutch and Javanese such phrases as " Where is the Commander " " Sec. Commander come here," " We are withdrawing." In other cases the names of Dutch officers were known and when they answered to their names they were dealt with speedily by means of a grenade or a knife. On the Mayu peninsula in Burma, Japanese have attempted to mislead Indian troops by speaking Urdu and Hindustani, issuing orders and making commonplace remarks. It may safely be concluded that with their thorough organization the Japanese would adopt the language of any troops they knew to be opposed to them. This presents a problem where the African is concerned which must receive the closest attention of all European commanders.

DISPOSAL OF JAPANESE P.W.

6. If the Japanese soldier is taken prisoner his immediate reaction is thinking out of a plan to take his life which he believes belongs to His Emperor and should be given for the honour of the Emperor in order to vindicate himself in the eyes of his ancestors. Keep weapons including knives well away from him.

JAPANESE CUNNING.

7. Cases have occurred of Japanese "corpses" on being approached for burial suddenly coming to life and causing casualties with either hand grenades or machine guns.

. Knowing that his features are new to his European enemies the Japanese goes to great lengths to pass himself off as a Chinaman, Burman, Malay, Kachin and even Indian. It is easy to familiarize oneself with Japanese features. Failure to do so may cost you your life.

9. All Japanese wear a loin cloth known as a "fundoshi". In searching a P.W. this must also be removed unless one is prepared to risk the sudden production of a hand grenade, knife or revolver. A knife must be kept away from a Japanese P.W. His favourite form of "honourable suicide" is slitting of the belly, better known as "hara kiri".

JAPANESE USE OF WEAPONS.

10. Early in the operations against Japanese forces many reports were received of field guns used by infantry Platoons well forward and of the existence of sub-machine guns. The artillery gun proved to be the 70 mm. bn. mortar gun and the sub-machine gun was the light L.M.G. which is used from the hip and is also fitted with a bayonet. In reporting Japanese activity it should always be borne in mind that a platoon has three grenade dischargers equivalent in performance to our 2″ mortar. The grenade discharger may be used with either shells or hand grenades. Identify the weapons or fire before making a report.

JAPANESE UNIFORM.

11. Get acquainted with Japanese military and naval uniform but never expect to meet a Japanese dressed as you would expect. He has been encountered wearing only shorts and in bare feet, on other occasions with only a loin cloth (fundoshi), and sometimes in long pantaloons and puttees with either boots or rubber shoes (tabi). He also wears black or brown "gym" shoes and his head dress may be either a steel helmet or a fatigue cap or even captured Australian slouch hats or tropical helmets. He often has an open necked tennis shirt and has been known to wear Chinese and Indian uniforms and Burmese, Malayan, and other native dress.

12. As a general rule both Japanese officers and N.C.O's carry a heavy sword, and can therefore easily be distinguished. It is a symbol of office but at the same time Japanese are expert in using the sword.

CHARACTERS AND CODE NUMBERS.

13. While Japanese is difficult to read owing to the variety of characters used, some Chinese and some Japanese

numbers and dates can readily be translated by a European if the Japanese characters for numerals are memorized. This is important as Japanese units are generally known by a code number while equipment is numbered or dated. If simple characters cannot be read at least copy them accurately for information.

14. It should be borne in mind that the Japanese date system does not coincide with our own. Two systems are in use. Firstly the Japanese Empire, according to mythology, was founded in the year 660 B.C. and therefore to bring a Japanese year to our own date the figure 660 should be deducted i.e. the Japanese year 2600 is equivalent to our date 1940. The second system is the one in more general use and is based on the Emperor's reign. Thus the present Emperor who came to the Throne in 1925 chose the name Showa (Enlightement) for his reign. The year 1943 would therefore be known as "Showa 18" or the 18th year since accession. Japanese is always written from right to left whether vertically or horizontally. Therefore 18/11/8 would be the 8th of November, 1943, and not as might be read in English the 18th of November, 1908. In the interpretation of dates found on equipment, documents, etc., care should be taken to ensure that the correct date is read.

FORCED LABOUR TROOPS.

15. The Japanese have always been quick to employ forced labour from Chinese or native theatres. In addition it is known (and in fact a Formosan Bn. was identified in New Guinea) that there are within the Japanese Army, units recruited from the oppressed territories of Korea, Manchuria and Formosa, to act as bearers or pioneers. These troops would have little military training and generally speaking would desert at the first opportunity, especially during periods when Japanese forces were hard pressed. While the type of information these troops could supply is naturally limited, there is no doubt that much useful data can be obtained.

16. The Japanese call their Pioneer units "Setsuetai" or literally billeting or quartering soldiers. A Korean recently captured stated that he belonged to part of a Unit which had been formed as the result of 2,000 volunteers coming forward. They had not been told that they were required for service overseas.

TRAITOR FORCES.

17. When the Japanese Army occupied Burma, the Burma Independent Army was much in evidence but after a number of incidents directed at the native population by the more unruly elements in the "traitor" army the Japanese disbanded the force and formed a new one called the Burma Defence Army. It is reported that the B.D.A. is dressed in captured British uniforms i.e. khaki shorts and shirts but wear the Japanese fatigue cap and rubber boots. Various badges have been worn by Burmese but no confirmed identifications have been made. It is well to remember however that the emblem of Burma is a peacock in its pride and therefore a badge embodying a peacock or the Burmese National colours of red, yellow and green would in all probability denote Burmese troops.

18. In operations North of Akyab a number of Indians were found attached to Japanese forward standing patrols and were being used to question suspects and to report to the sentries on suspected agents. These men were wearing arm bands with Japanese characters which translated meant "Self Protection, Japanese Army".

19. The Japanese have attempted to start a so called Indian National Army from Indians residing in Japan, Burma and from captured Indian P.O.W. While they may have met with a certain amount of success many attempts to get Sepoys and Gurkhas to return to India as agents have failed. The possibility of Congress sympathisers and disgruntled Indians working for the Japanese must however be considered. When Indian units are used in operations against the Japanese the fact that our words of command, habits, and organization may be thoroughly known by the enemy must be considered and counter measures taken.

SECURITY.

20. While Japanese security is extremely good where major issues are concerned examples of laxity have been

noted from time to time. Japanese pilots take certain documents into the air which they are told should be jettisoned if they should get into difficulties. Documents which have proved extremely useful have been found scattered around the countryside after an aircraft has crashed. All Japanese bodies should be searched. A number of very illuminating diaries have been taken in this manner so far while officers and N.C.O's seem to carry a considerable number of documents into action.

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTALION INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND ITS TRAINING

GENERAL.

1. Experience gained in Burma and the S.W. Pacific has proved conclusively that the bn. intelligence section is a most necessary valuable sub-unit of the battalion.

2. The askari may lack the formal education of the British soldier but he more than balances this deficiency by his natural inquisitiveness, his bushcraft, and his general fitness.

3. The training and duties of an intelligence section which are laid out below have been based on the proved capabilities of the askari. A.C.O. who uses his intelligence section as extra provost personnel, for picquets, and for odd fatigues will find that in battle he has wasted a vital and immediate source of information.

EMPLOYMENT.

4. The duties which the intelligence section will be called upon to perform include the following:—

(i) To observe and report enemy movements and dispositions.

Observation Posts are difficult to site in jungle and thick bush, and may therefore have to be sited in front of, or to the flank of, forward

units; they may also be sited with arty O.Ps. Where it is impossible to site O.Ps., intelligence groups may be used to carry out special recces.

(ii) To study the topography of the unit area and the surrounding country, including lines of approach to and from our own and the enemy's position.

(iii) To perform special tasks :

These may include an intelligence group accompanying a fighting patrol to obtain documents, for liaison duties, etc.

DUTIES OF A BATTALION INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

5. During static conditions the intelligence officer trains all ranks of his section and in addition 100% reserve. He must see that his section understands the need for and purpose of military security measures applicable to a battalion. He must also ensure that all ranks of the battalion are kept informed of the most up-to-date information on the Japanese Armed Forces.

6. During active operations the intelligence officer's responsibilities are :—

(i) To study the progress of the battle on the front, flanks and rear of his unit, and to be prepared to give information on the dispositions of his own unit and of neighbouring troops.

(ii) To collect, sift and collate intelligence reports emanating from within the unit, and to distribute information so obtained.

(iii) To circulate to all concerned information received from higher and flank headquarters.

(iv) To ensure that the unit is supplied with up-to-date maps and aerial photographs.

In jungle warfare it is essential that the intelligence officer is adept at the interpretation of aerial photographs.

(v) To see that orders are carried out concerning prisoners of war, captured documents and material.

(vi) To ensure that in his absence, the European sergeant is performing his duties at H.Q.

(vii) To ensure that all sub-unit commanders receive the latest information concerning their own areas and the enemy opposed to them.

(viii) To keep up to date the unit intelligence records including the enemy Order-of-battle book, the battalion intelligence diary, the collation file and the battle map.

The Order of battle book should be divided into two parts. The enemy forces should be listed under localities in the first part (see Appendix "A") and under units in the second part (see Appendix "B"). A collation file is merely a record of information about the enemy under subjects (i.e. weapons, training, morale, personalities, etc.). An ordinary note book divided into sections is sufficient for this. The compilation of lengthy reports and summaries during active warfare will be impossible; the intelligence officer will be able to give information far more quickly and accurately on a battle map than by devoting time to written reports. This does not absolve the intelligence officer from sending back information to higher headquarters whenever possible. Full use will be made of the education sergeant for recording information.

(ix) To ensure that his O.Ps. are transmitting information as quickly as possible.

O.Ps. must be established, where possible, immediately on the occupation of a position. To ensure rapid communication, movement of O.Ps. will be by bounds, contact being made with headquarters, company headquarters and flank units on the completion of each move.

(x) Issue of periodical intelligence Summaries.

TRAINING OF THE BATTALION INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

6. The main principles in the training of the section are simplicity and repetition: the intelligence officer must speak fluent Swahili or Chinyanga.

7. Training is best carried out in two periods, a preliminary period when all personnel of the secton, including a 100% reserve, undergo an intensive four weeks intelligence course; and an advanced period when intelligence groups are attached to platoon and company training, and later battalion training when the section may be exercised as a whole.

8. The main points to note in preparing an intelligence course are :—

(i) Every period should include some practical application of the lesson brought out.

(ii) Each theoretical period must be followed by a practical period on the same subject.

(iii) The day's work should follow a sequence of related subjects since it is only by continuity that an idea will become fixed in the askari's mind.

A series of unrelated subjects will only confuse him and individual lessons will not be grasped.

(iv) A test must be held at the end of each week to give the intelligence officer an idea of how the askaris are assimilating the subjects taught.

An askari who is making no progress in the course should returned to his company forthwith.

(v) The battalion education sergeant will be used to train the askaris in map-reading and simple field sketching; at the same time be himself will be trained in intelligence duties so that in active operations he will take his place in the battalion intelligence office.

9. The subjects to be taught during courses are as shewn below :—

Notes.
i. A period equals 50 minutes.
ii. A week to consist of 40 periods.
iii. Four weeks to consist of 160 periods.
iv. Subjects are not given in any particular order.
v. A minimum of two periods a week should be allotted to night work.

Subject	Periods
Physical training and unarmed combat ...	21
Weapon training (all arms) and interior economy ...	21
Map reading	16
Field sketching	16
Judging distance, numbers and sound	10
Use of compass	5

Reports, messages, recce reports,—written and verbal.	12
Observation training including use of binoculars ...	6
Siting an O.P.	2
Upkeep of a simple O.P. log (Appendix "E") ...	4
Types of information required	6
Topography	4
Duties of an intelligence section	2
Fieldcraft	8
Camouflage	4
Clock-ray method of recognition and description ...	2
Field telephone	2
Organisation of a bn. incl. comns.	1
Japanese Army	4
Bn. in attack	1
Bn. in defence	1
Bn. breaking contact	1
National markngs and aircraft recognition	1
Propaganda talk on general situation	4
Security within the battalion	3
Anti-gas training	3
Total ...	160

SELECTION OF ASKARIS FOR "I" WORK.

10. Attempts to train an African intelligence section merely as a counter-part of the correspondng section in the British Army would result in cramping the African's individuality, his skill in bushcraft, his cunning in making contacts with local natives, without necessarily giving him sufficient compensations in the form of other qualifications. But modern warfare demands a high level of general intelligence work and an intelligence section must include one or two members capable of carrying out more specialised tasks.

11. The N.C.O's should be men with army experience and should be literate. An askari who can read and write—not necessarily English but his own language—can be more readily taught to observe and record information about enemy uniforms, badges, and weapons, and can assess numbers and distances with a higher degree of accuracy than an illiterate, no matter how good the latter's visual memory may be. It is worth the intelligence officer's while to select one or two intelligent young men and teach them reading and writing. They will then be able to learn specialised duties in a tenth of the time taken by the ordinary askari.

12. On the other hand the product of elementary and mission schools are not necessarily those with the quickest brains. An African who has learned a skilled trade, (mechanic, carpenter, etc.) has usually developed the faculty of depending on his own efforts, using his powers of judgement, and is likely to be quicker in the uptake than one who has had only a scholastic education.

13. Moslems, on the whole, provide dependable types of askaris for intelligence work. The smattering of Arabic, which many of them possess, is a considerable asset both in and out of Africa.

NOTES ON ASKARIS AS I-PERSONNEL.

14. The African's powers of observation are on the whole well developed, particularly in the case of those brought up in the bush. East African forces are recruited from so many different tribes that it should be remembered that an askari who is at home in one type of country may not be so efficient as an observer in another. For instance the SOMALIS of the semi-desert regions are at a distinct disadvantage in hilly or forest country, while forest dwellers find themselves at a similar loss in arid country. It should be emphasized, however, that this is primarily a matter of adjustment and any initial difficulties experienced by the individual are likely to disappear as he becomes accustomed to fresh types of country.

15. One of the principle failings of the African is his inability to report accurately what he has seen. His memory is short, and this coupled with his innate desire to give the answer he thinks is required is largely responsible for inaccurate reports.

Training of the African should, therefore, be directed along lines which will ensure sound knowledge of every type of country in which he is likely to be called upon to operate, and should include ample scope for observing and reporting on the natural features of the country in question.

> **Training Example.** There is a river 15 miles away. The askari is told to walk there and back and report what natural features he has seen on the way. Will he remember (a) how many ridges he has passed on route, (b) the direction of any hills or mountain ranges, (c) the incidence of thick bush or forest and its possible effect on the impeding of M.T., (d) the direction, approx. speed, width, etc., of the river? He will probably **observe** these things, but without sound training it is very doubtful whether his memory will prove equal to more than a vague report.

The first essential therefore is to ensure that the askari is trained as rapidly as possible to give a full, accurate verbal report on the country in which he has been ordered to reconnoitre.

16. Once the askari has been suitably trained in observation he should be given instruction in the use of the compass and field glasses. Unless he has reached the necessary standard of education his proficiency in the use of the former will necessarily be very much retarded. It may be found that many Africans, notably the Somali, the Turkana, Masai and Makamba tribes of Kenya, and their bush-counterparts from Tanganyika, appear to be capable of picking up objects at great distances without the use of glasses. However good they may be in this direction it should not be allowed to interfere with their training in the use of glasses as, once they are accustomed to their use it will augment their power to study the object in question.

17. As in the case of ground observation, individuals of certain tribes show very much more aptitude for personal concealment and camouflage than others. Generally speaking "hunting tribes" with long experience in the pursuit of game have a natural ability for concealment. In other cases the guiding instinct appears to be that of the ostrich-with-his-head-in-the-sand, and the use of dead ground, avoidance of skylines, etc., has to be carefully inculcated.

Askaris generally are not good at remaining motionless for any length of time, which increases the necessity for emphasis in training of choosing the best possible position for observation of an enemy position.

18. The intelligent askari appears to become readily conversant with conventional signs. His greatest difficulty in the preparation of sketches is his lack of sense of proportion. His natural inclination is to exaggerate objects in the foreground, and however carefully he has prepared the scale of his sketch he is inclined to regard the scale as a separate entity with little further bearing on the work for the work for which it was prepared. His greatest delight is in the use of coloured pencils for roads, rivers, etc., and the time taken in the use of these, unless carefully supervised, is often out of all proportion to the value of the sketch.

EQUIPMENT.

19. A Bn. I.O's equipment should be kept to a minimum. An intelligence box (VFO191 MK.1) if available and a box for holding spare maps is the maximum necessary even when transport and operational conditions are favourable. In addition to his normal personal equipment (compass, map case, binoculars, etc.) the bn. I.O. should be able to keep his records in four notebooks (O of B, I-diary, O.P. log, Miscellaneous notes) capable of being carried in a haversack. One or two carefully selected manuals on enemy forces (provided they are publications permitted in forward areas) will be enough as a reference library.

20. The following is an extract from a report on Intelligence sections operating in jungle country in S.W. Pacific :—

> " Maps and stationery become sodden and even mouldy, air photos sticky, pencils become unusable, carbon paper deteriorates quickly. It is quite impossible to carry any "fancy" gear, and the following is probably the limit of material that can be carried:—
>
> Maps showing tracks
> Compass
> Binoculars
> Message pad and carbon

Notebooks and pencil
Diary or log
Tracing paper
Blank grid traces

—and a small waterproof bag or an oilskin to hold this material."

(See also: East African Training Intelligence Pamphlet No. 5. Section 5. Guide for Standing Orders for an Infantry Battalion. Part III. Duties in Battle).

CHAPTER VII

INTERPRETERS — GUIDES — AGENTS

INTERPRETERS.

1. Reliable interpreters are not easily to be found although innumerable natives will offer their services in this capacity. Interpreting is often a novel and pleasing occupation for the African as, besides satisfying his enormous natural sense of curiosity, it increases his importance among his fellows and gives him a brief period of social ascendancy.

2. Official interpreters are employed by the Civil Administration and it is best to apply to the nearest D.C. for the services of a qualified individual when such is required. If this is out of the question then the best must be made of local material.

3. Experience shows that the most suitable men for interpreters are ex N.C.O's from army or police. Although not of a high standard of education they have had some training and discipline and are usually truthful. They can be trusted to interpret faithfully to the best of their ability. However it must not be lost sight of that good interpreting is to be rare in a country where there are so many dialects.

4. The primary failing of the unofficial interpreter is his unwillingness to pass on information, sentence by sentence, as he acquires it. Too often, after a 10 minute interrogation of the subject, the interpreter only consents to pass on the briefest resume of a conversation which may have been of the most vital interest. SOMALIS are the most notorious offenders in this respect, and in their case particularly, no indication should ever be given of the answer required, or it will be given, irrespective of its connection with the informer's statements.

5. Interpreters should be as far as possible of good caste or from tribes of good social standing so that he can be employed without giving offence to notables.

GUIDES AND TRACKERS.

6. Guides are fairly easily obtainable in most districts, and among pastoral communities who range wide afield in search of grazing, there are to be found individuals with a really sound knowledge of the country. Otherwise few of the natives of E. Africa are of use as guides out of their own districts.

7. Guides may be obtained either through the local D.C. or on application to the nearest chief or headman. D.C's tribal Police known variously as Kanga, Dubas or Illalo are often employed in this capacity with the most satisfactory results, and in many cases have proved more reliable than the ordinary native.

8. The MASAI undoubtedly take first place as guides. Many of these people are Nomads and know every footpath and water-hole, hundreds of miles from their own bomas. Many placenames over a wide area of East Africa are of Masai origin. The various SOMALI tribes, as well as the TURKANA, and WAKAMBA, etc., are adept trackers. The native invariably expresses distance in terms of marching hours based on 3 to 4 miles per hour. His idea of time is, however, very vague and it is seldom worth while endeavouring to pin him down to some fine point of distance.

9. Many East African Natives can be trained as trackers. They have frequently been employed as such by the police in trailing cattle thieves. But they cannot be compared with the "Black Trackers of Australia" or the Bushmen, or Hottentot of South Africa.

AGENTS.

10. A Native agent should be employed only to collect information that can be observed or easily checked (such as

facts about places, numbers of persons, distances, topography). If he is used to make a general report or given any political mission, he will inevitably make use of it to blackmail other natives under the threat of informing against them. Political information is best obtained from general conversation with chiefs or well-informed notables. While it probably necessary to pay an agent a small regular sum to enable him to buy food and meet odd expenses, his main payment should be by results.

11. In spite of their failings the SOMALIS still make the best interpreters and agents. They are fond of adventure and like to appear important and are willing to take some risks to satisfy these two desires. They are quick-witted, have a good memory for names and places, and can usually make coherent reports. At the same time they expect to be well-paid for their services: like all Africans they will embellish their tale to please the hearer or out of their own love for dramatisation. Their intense tribal jealousies make them unreliable reporters as far as SOMALI affairs go but they can usually give fairly balanced accounts of happenings and personalities among other African races.

SECURITY.

12. All native employees should be checked by G.S.I. (b) or Field Security.

CHAPTER VIII

INTERPRETATION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY

(Bush, jungle, and desert landscape)

1. PRELIMINARY.

An interpreter of air photographs should never be considered as a wizard who sits apart and furnishes from pieces of paper the exact and complete picture of the enemy's dispositions. He requires the assistance of specialists from all arms. His opinions on what he sees in the photographs should not be accepted without reference to those most likely to confirm or dispute his views.

Essential to an interpreter are :

(i) Constant practice
(ii) Personal knowledge of objects under examination
(iii) Personal knowledge of how the objects would be represented in plan view
(iv) Access to and careful study of intelligence reports
(v) Application and interest in his work.

The examination of vertical air photographs should be carried out in a magnifying stereoscope. The maximum magnification consistent with definition should be chosen.

As a rough guide, the limiting size of objects which may be seen at scales of 1/20,000, 1/12,000, and 1/8,000 are about 8, 5, and 3 feet respectively. Enlargement in most cases will not assist in interpretation; definition is lost and although it is obvious, it is not always realised that anything which does not appear on a contact print will never magically appear on an enlargement.

When placing photographs in the stereoscope it is important to orientate the prints so that the shadows of natural objects fall **away** from the source of light, that is, **towards** the observer. This will not be possible when the shadows lie in the same direction as the run of photographs, but the rule should be adhered to when possible. So accustomed is the eye to viewing objects with their shadows falling **below** that a deviation from this (in the stereoscope) may create a false relief. Valleys will appear as hills, hills as valleys, and trees and houses as small pits in the ground. The confusion of mounds with wide trenches is liable to occur.

Air photographs are taken on Panchromatic film. The subject is translated from colour into relative tones ranging from black to white. On the modern film, the balance between colour and monochrome is fairly well maintained, so that it is safe to assume that a dark object on a photograph will in reality be dark in tone or colour.

2. GENERAL.

When interpreting air photographs taken in bush country, examination should begin on the main lines of communication and, if time permits, far back on these lines.

The routes of supply will consist chiefly of railways, roads and rivers, but they may possibly include tracks from landing-grounds along which airborne troops have passed with light equipment.

In dense jungle, where a thick overhead canopy hides human activity beneath it, little can be found from photos. A band of trees of darker tone will indicate a watercourse; a wide river will be obvious and should be examined for bridges, pontoons, ferries, boats and signs of activity along its banks; flecks of white, reflection from a road through breaks in the canopy, may enable the whole road to be traced.

Factors which aid in the detection of main routes of supply include :

- (i) Destruction of surface vegetation by transport so that the soil is exposed. Soil pressed smooth will reflect light strongly in dry weather, and this brilliance will be accentuated on a photograph.
- (ii) The easiest and shortest routes are generally used to conserve transport and fuel. Cover may therefore have been disregarded for the sake of convenience.
- (iii) Jetties at deep water landing places on rivers may prove to be the starting points of roads and tracks.
- (iv) Open country near the water's edge may indicate the existence of beaches suitable for running-up landing craft and prove likewise to be the starting points of roads.

Once established, the enemy's main routes of supply have to be followed up to their logical termination at his front lines.

It is at this stage that the real difficulties of interpretation begin. The enemy will use all means of cover at hand and the evidence of his presence is gathered from small clues. In fact, detection depends largely upon his lapses from the general rule of cover. For example, camouflage may conceal his gun positions, but insufficiently camouflaged tracks leading up to them will disclose them beyond possible doubt.

Tracks are of the greatest importance—their points of origin, terminus, width, gradient and newness. In bush country these tracks may disappear completely under trees and fail to reappear, and in this instance, if the track is new and well used, deductions can be drawn from an examination of the spoor itself.

3. MAIN LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

(A) **Railways.** (See Fig. 1, Appendix "J").

Railways are distinguished by dead-straight lengths and very gentle curves. Embankments will cast diffused shadows outwards and cuttings inwards, across the track:—

When the scale of the photograph is small, the actual rails are difficult to detect and the corrugations in a main road can often be mistaken for sleepers. When in doubt, the type of culvert or bridge used to carry the track should be examined carefully.

(B) **Main Roads.** (See Fig. 2 and 3, Appendix "J").

Tarred roads should appear black or dark grey; but where the sun is directly reflected from them to the camera they will appear light grey. Macadamised roads, owing to their nature, will appear lighter in tone, but are darker than unmade roads in dry weather. Bends in roads are usually steeper than those of railways.

Fig. 2, shows heavily tarred road coming in from the right. Road passing out at bottom of print is lightly tarred (granulated surface). Light railway can be identified at termination of tarred road.

Fig. 3, shows first class metalled road. Could be mistaken for railway if not examined carefully.

(C) **Secondary Roads and Tracks.**
(See Figs. 4, 5 and 6, Appendix "J").

Secondary roads will generally be narrower than main roads and wind considerably. There is less evidence of grading and drainage, and the bridges will be narrow. The general tone should be light, but this will vary according to the traffic and the degree of dampness present on the surface.

Tracks are disclosed as white threads, winding as they follow the contour of the country and avoid small obstacles.

They are difficult to keep in view in bush country and may peter out altogether. However, if the track appears well worn at its origin at a road, the fact that it ends after a short distance should not be taken as evidence of abandonment. Branch tracks leading to camps, dumps, etc. should be looked for in the surrounding country.

Fig. 5, shows well worn track leaving a secondary road. Fig. 6 shows M/T tracks disappearing under trees, probably to a dump.

In mobile warfare when a battery may be in action for only a short period at one place, the tracks in the vicinity may be invisible; but if a position is occupied for a day or so, they become clearly defined and form one of the most definite indications of the battery's locality. A characteristic pattern will be visible:—

(a) In wet ground or sand the impressions left by horse-teams or tractors.
(b) Tracks behind gun positions will often disclose the type of position, even though the guns are camouflaged.
(c) Tracks formed from ammunition limbers.
(d) Tracks radiating from guns to ammunition dumps.
(e) Tracks to dugouts and quarters.
(f) Tracks to observers' posts.
(g) Blast marks appearing as small white patches in front of the guns.

Other tracks may disclose the location of :—

(a) Advanced Headquarters.
(b) Gaps in wire defences.
(c) Occupied trench systems.
(d) Advanced listening posts.

4. COVER. (See Figs. 7, 8, 9, Appendix "J").

The enemy will endeavour to camouflage and disperse his war equipment in conformity with the nature of the vegetation.

Fig. 7, shows a group of at least seven huts camouflaged by dispersal among natural objects of similar size.

The photograph in Fig. 8 is an example of a job well done, but not well enough. It was from this actual print (on the same contact scale) that the battery of guns, shown in Fig. 9, was discovered.

Had the enemy destroyed the **form** of his weapon-pits by the use of scrub or garnished netting, the position would have remained undetected.

The Interpreter's job is to detect the enemy's lapses from the rules of camouflage, catch him in the act of construction or camouflage work and so disclose his whole defensive/offensive system.

5. WIRE DEFENCE. (See Figs. 10, 11, Appendix "J").

Wire defences are often difficult to detect when new, but the tracks left by working parties will often disclose their presence. When wire is placed along ditches or hedges it is almost impossible to detect on air photographs.

There is a tendency, however, probably in the interests of economy, to stretch wire in straight lines. At first even this wire may be invisible: but as time passes, moisture condensed on the wire and dropping to the ground, together with the protection afforded the soil beneath the wire, will tend to increase the vegetation in the vicinity. The effects of this will be noticeable on photographs. (See Fig. 10).

Wire can often be detected by the fact that animals have gazed on one side of the fence. Here the grass will be shorter and the ground exposed will reflect more light. (See Fig. 11).

6. FIELD ARTILLERY AND GUN POSITIONS.
(See Fig. 12, Appendix "J").

Field artillery on forward positions in bush country may be hard to detect from air photographs, but a study of tracks, as already mentioned, will be of great help. The guns may be concealed with garnished nets, but the tracks to the positions will be hard to camouflage and their general lay-out may reveal the gun sites.

The type and number of guns in emplacements will depend upon the enemy's organization, and this should be ascertained before interpretation.

Guns are often sited at regular intervals and in straight lines. This regularity makes for ease of interpretation as shown in Fig. 12.

The Interpreter should consult R.A. before passing an opinion as to calibre, etc.

7. M.GS. (See Fig. 13, Appendix "J").

Machine guns are difficult, if not impossible, to detect in themselves; but the lines of communication frequently give away their positions. The actual weapon-pit is often seen, although the gun is invisible.

Fig. 13, shows wire and trench system. M.G. pits are clearly visible. Wire is badly rusted. Tracks are visible through gaps in wire.

When interpreting, it is important to view the country as though defending it. This method often discloses strong points missed in preliminary work. Heights commanding wide angles and roads are always suspect.

8. IDENTIFICATION OF OBJECTS FROM THEIR SHADOWS.

(See Figs. 14, 15, 16, Appendix "J").

Cast shadows are helpful in the identification of objects on the ground. Photographs taken at an early or late hour in the day, when the shadows are long, are the most satisfactory in this respect.

Fig. 14 shows a mosque revealed by shadows.

Fig. 15 reveals from shadow the type of construction of a bridge.

In Fig. 16 W/T masts are shown by cast shadows.

9. REFLECTED LIGHT: DIFFERING TONE VALUES.

(See Figs. 17, 18, Appendix "J").

Assuming that the sun is high, certain rays from ground or water will strike back into the lens, thus:—



The tone of the photograph will be lighter at the side of the photograph that covers the ground reflecting light directly into the camera lens.

10. DIFFERENCE IN TONE VALUE DUE TO MOISTURE.

(See Figs. 19, 20, 21, 22, Appendix "J").

The presence of moisture in the surface soil tends to darken the tone.

Fig. 19 shows the preparation of an anti-tank trench. The dampness of the soil and light dispersion increase the depth of tone.

In Fig. 20 damp patches on the road appear darker than the rest of the road.

Fig. 21 shows water-logged cultivation with direct reflections from the sun.

Damp patches appear dark in Fig. 22. The ground is lighter where it is drying or has dried out.

11. "MADE" GROUND. (See Fig. 23, Appendix "J").

Compressed earth or "made" ground, such as airfields, will, if the surface has dried, appear lighter in tone than the surroundings. This is shown in Fig. 23 which is a photograph of an airfield under construction.

12. TYPES OF BUSH COUNTRY.

(See Figs. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, Appendix "J").

Fig. 24 shows heavily wooded country along watercourses affording ideal cover.

Fig. 25 shows sparse thorn bush on sand. This type of country does not afford very good cover from air observation.

Fig. 26 shows sand dunes with a few bushes.

Fig. 27 shows gully erosion in bush country.

Fig. 28 shows dense bush.

Fig. 29 shows open bush with large trees in short grass.

Fig. 30 shows hilly country with thin bush. The effect of shadows cast from high hills is well brought out.

13. PHOTOGRAPHIC FORMULA AND OTHER DATA.

When air photographs are received they should be accompanied by the following data. Some of this may be inscribed on the edge of the print, but, if not, it should have been included in a separate report :—

(i) Height of photography above ground or sea level. } or scale of photographs.

(ii) Focal length of lens used

Note : If the scale is not given, it is found from the formula :—

$$\frac{\text{Focal length of lens in inches}}{\text{Height of aircraft above ground in inches}}$$

Example : 8″ lens. Ht. above ground 8,000ft. =

$$\frac{8}{8000 \times 12} = \text{Scale} = \frac{1}{12{,}000}$$

(iii) Direction in which strip of photographs was flown, giving serial number of first and last prints. From this data the North Point is determined.

(iv) Time of commencing and ending photography. From this, if the direction of 'run' is not given, the North Point may be determined by reference to the sun's Declination, Latitude and shadows of objects on the photographs.

(v) Locality or map or square reference.

If photographic enlargements are subsequently asked for, the enlargement factor should be supplied with the prints in case the original photographs have been disposed of and the new scale is required

It will be obvious that once the scale of a photograph is known, the length or dimensions of any object on the ground may be determined—breadths of rivers, lengths of bridges, etc.

14. OBLIQUE PHOTOGRAPHY. (See Fig. 31, Appendix "J").

No reference has been made to this type of photograph. The interpretation is essentially the same, the difference being that interpretation is normally done from one photograph and not a stereo pair.

Oblique photographs are very useful to the Artillery, in giving a general and readily understandable view of the country under observation :—

The "Merton" method of oblique photography for artillery use is beyond the scope of this chapter.

15. METHOD OF ANNOTATION.

The most satisfactory method of annotating photographs is by marking the information on a piece of tracing paper or linen attached to the back of the photograph and folded over to the front. In this way the detail on the trace will coincide with that of the photograph without any obliteration of the objects found on the print.

16. INTERPRETATION MATERIALS.

The Interpreter in the field should have the following equipment :—

A good magnifying glass.
A magnifying stereoscope.
A graduated steel ruler to show 1/100ths of an inch.
Proportional compass.
A fine-pointed set of dividers.
A ruling-pen.
A celluloid transparent protractor.
A ,, ,, set square.
A parallel ruler.
A bevelled ruler.
Tracing paper or tracing linen.
Mapping pens, Indian ink, pencils, erasers.
Steel pins, paper fasteners.
Tube of liquid glue.
Paper weights.
Slide rule and tables (Optional).

For convenience, the whole outfit should be fitted into a metal-bound wooden case with carrying handle.

A folding chair and table should be issued to the Interpreter.

CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND SUMMARIES.

GENERAL.

1. Intelligence reports, summaries, reviews, and appreciations must aim at clearness, conciseness and accuracy. Facts should be marshalled and tabulated: all information not necessary to the unit commander's operational plan

should be rigorously excluded. Where information is unconfirmed or of doubtful origin (but cannot be ignored) the low degree of reliability must be emphasised. But reports should not be delayed for the sake of elaboration or fuller confirmation. The best information in the world is useless unless it arrives **in time for the commander to make use of it.** The deduction or conclusion must be clearly stated in simple English. The essence of a good report was once summed up as : " It is no good unless it can be read by the light of a match on a windy night by someone sitting on a fidgety horse."

REPORTS

2. An officer carrying out a topographical or other reconnaissance must plan it with the same care as any other operation of war. He should take the following successive steps :—

- (i) He should make certain that he understands the object of the reconnaissance and his orders, that he has been given all the information that he requires and that he is quite clear what questions he has to answer in his report; he should divide these up under suitable headings.
- (ii) Before starting he should study the map, get as much information from it as possible, plan an itinerary in conformity with the time available and look for suitable view points.
- (iii) He should decide in outline what form his report should take, and whether a sketch or plan will be required to supplement the map on any particular points.
- (iv) He should make sure that he has got all the implements that he requires, e.g. field glasses, compass, notebook, ruled paper for sketching, pencils, etc.
- (v) During the reconnaissance, he should keep his object and orders constantly in mind; and, so far as possible, put himself in the position of the commander for whom the reconnaissance is being made.

3. The information in a military report should be precise and definite; vague or ambiguous expressions must be avoided. Thus "a fairly wide stream", "a large quantity of forage" may mean anything; if exact figures cannot be given, an approximation should at least be made, e.g.: "a stream about 20 feet wide," "about ten tons of hay." It is more important that the information in a report should be relevant and accurate and that it should arrive in time to be of use than that the report should be elaborate. A report should contain no information already available from other sources such as a map, but negative information or information confirming something already obtained is often of value.

Reconnoitring officers must remember that reports in the field often form the basis of a plan or movement so that inaccuracies may have serious military consequences.

4. The clearness of a report depends much on its form and arrangement. A long rambling statement in narrative form is difficult to grasp and inconvenient to refer to.

The following rules will assist to make a report easily readable :—

- (i) The report should be headed with the subject of the report and the name of the officer making it, e.g.: " Report on the suitability for mechanical transport of the route from X to Y, by Lieut. Z."
- (ii) A margin should be kept on the left-hand side of the body of the report; the headings of the paragraphs should be written in this margin, and underlined; all paragraphs should be headed and numbered.
- (iii) Reports should be signed (giving rank and unit), dated and, if necessary, timed.

Reports in the field have often to be read by a tired man in a bad light; therefore they must be easily legible; all names of places should be printed in block capitals.

5. A guide as to the headings which may be required in various types of report is given in Appendix "H" and in the Field Service Pocket Book. Commonsense will be the

best guide as to what headings are required and what are not. It is most useful to attach a short summary, containing the essential information in tabloid form at the beginning of all except very short reports; this summary should not usually take up more than a page of an ordinary notebook.

6. When the accuracy of a piece of information cannot be personally verified the sources of it should always be given and the degree of reliability attached to it, e.g.: "this distance was given by several villagers, questioned independently, and is considered accurate."

7. A rough sketch or plan is often useful to illustrate a report: clearness, accuracy and relevance are the essentials, not artistic effect. Panoramas or thumbnail sketches are also occasionally of value, but require some knowledge of drawing; the temptation which may beset a good draughtsman to embellish a report with neat but not specially relevant drawings must be resisted.

SUMMARIES.

8. Intelligence summaries form the principal medium for the distribution of information to staffs and fighting units. Normally a battalion intelligence summary is unnecessary and in operations information is best communicated by sketch maps. But occasionally during static conditions or lulls in operations the summary can be produced. Besides being a form of useful record it can also serve as the "I" war diary. It also forms a vehicle to which appendices for training purposes or general information can be attached.

9. Intelligence summaries should be laid out in paragraphs numbered by Roman figures with sub-paragraphs listed alphabetically. Subject paragraphs should retain the same numbers which will be those used by higher formations. This enables the system of collation throughout a force to be uniform. Collation files are normally only "I" summary paragraphs clipped out and pasted in chronological order under subject headings in a notebook. Map references and place names will always be given from the 1:500,000 or standard map.

10. The form of "I" summaries in East Africa Command is as follows :

UNIT........... INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO..........
(covering period—hrs. Apr. to hrs. Apr. 42.)
Ref. maps. E. AFRICA.................

(i) Operations
(ii) Identifications
(iii) Personalities
(iv) Enemy Equipment
(v) Enemy Military Organisation
(vi) Enemy Methods, Training and Morale.
(vii) Topographical
(viii) Economic
(ix) Political
(x) Security
(xi) General.

11. The operations paragraph should mention any successful methods and tactics employed by our own forces. But avoid detailed accounts of our own operations. No mention must be made of our own units other than as "own troops" or "our patrols", etc. No mention will be made of the state or morale of our forces: this must be reported separately under MOST SECRET cover. Remember that the Intelligence Branch in operational matters (i.e. Ia work) deals with the enemy and his ways, NOT with our own troops.

12. Details of P.O.W's weapons, and equipment captured and enemy casualties should be included.

13. Sources of information (e.g. actual names of prisoners and their units or their time and place of capture, deserters, or civil informants) should never be given. "Agents" as a source of information should never be mentioned. Always give the degree of reliability but standardised systems of grading (i.e. A1, B2, etc.,) are generally unsatisfactory and it is better to say "Most reliable", "occasionally reliable", "untried sources", etc.

14. Paragraphs should contain only facts or the information accurately reproduced as it was reported. Comment or deduction should be given below the paragraph with a headline stating that it is comment.

15. An intelligence review should be issued periodically. It should trace the tendencies in the situation since the last review was issued and be more in the nature of an appreciation. It should not be merely a repetition of events already reported in intelligence summaries.

16. Summaries received from higher formations should be destroyed as soon as the contents have been noted. Out-of-date summaries should be destroyed or sent back to the rear for sorting. Care should be taken that summary distribution lists which would give away our order of battle are kept away from areas where they may fall into enemy hands. In any case the distribution list of a regular summary should only be issued occasionally and not with every summary. In active theatres it is safer to issue such distribution lists separately under MOST SECRET cover.

APPENDIX "A"

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE (By Localities)

DATE.

LOCATION.	UNIT.	STRENGTH.	PERSONALITIES.	REMARKS.
MULO MURTI ...	158 Col. INF. BN.	850	O.C. Col. SPINI. 2 i/c Maj. MACCHI. O.C. 1st Coy? O.C. 2nd Coy? O.C. 3rd Coy. Capt. GIANI.	Fought well at TUNA. Suffered very few casualties. Morale good. Formerly Brigaded in 3rd Col. Bde.
PILLAGIA ...	18 Col. INF. BN.	720	O.C. Col. POCO. 2 i/c Maj. CRISPI or ROSSI O.C. 1stCoy. Capt. BORELLI. O.C. 2nd Coy? O.C. 3rd Coy?	May have 2 Coys. detached at EL GUD. Morale poor. Suffered heavy casualties at EL PAK.
PILLAGIA ...	22 MTN. Tp.	140	Major BELLI.	4 75mm. Jack guns. Range 8000 yds. Guns can be dismantled into 4 camel or mule loads.
PILLAGIA ...	8 Desert Sqn.	80	Capt. BOLONI.	3 Sqns. each of 3 Mark 1 armd. Cars. Two sqns. mount one 37mm. gun and one 8mm. M.G. and BREDA L.M.G. Patrol range 200 miles.

APPENDIX "B"

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE (By Units)

UNIT.	STRENGTH.	REMARKS PERSONALITIES.	LOCATION.	LOCATION.	LOCATION.
21st COL. BDE.		Formed 1938 Gen. ORTOLINI.	2/8/38 ABBIA	7/10/39 MEJA	
3rd COL. BN.	800	Col. BRISCHI.	2/8/38 "	7/10/39 MEJA	
18th COL. BN.	800	Col. MANTINI.	2/8/38 "	12/10/39 MEJA	
42nd COL. BN.	800	Col. ALBINO.	2/8/38 "	18/10/39 PONTE	4/7/40 TULA
8th ARTY. T/'	120	Major ARNALDI. originally equipped with 65 mm. Pack guns but recent reports state have been issued with 75 mm. Fd. guns.	7/7/38 MEJA	18/8/39 MANDA	9/6/40 PONTE guns seen to arrive Portee on 3 ton Ford trucks. No pack animals.
71st ENGINEER COY.	150	Major CARLI or RISCHI. Have one pontoon sec: 14 x 12 ft. pontoons max. load 4 tons.	15/2/39 PONTE	1/3/40 MAJI	8/2/41 UALDAR
4th SHIFTA GP.	Approx. 600	Irregulars used as border patrols. Armed with 8 mm. rifles. No uniform.	Based on ABBIA. 16/3/38.	Based on ABBIA. 2/11/40.	Reported disbanded 17/3/41. Personnel may have been absorbed by new Inf. Bns.

APPENDIX "C"

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

(Detailed form as used by higher formations.)

1. Name of Unit ....

2. Position :

Date.	Place.	Co-ordinates.	Remarks.
....	....	....	....
....	....	....	....
....	....	....	....
....	....	....	....

3. Estimated Establishment—

Date.	Officers.	O.R.S.		Rifles.	M.G.'s		Mortars.		A.T.		Guns.	Howitz	A.F.V.		Aeroplanes.		
		Eu.	N.		Heavy.	Light.	Heavy.	Light.	Rifles.	Guns.			Medium.	Light.	Fighters.	Bombers.	Recce.

4. Reserves ....

5. Commander ....

6. Character of Commr. ....

APPENDIX "C"—Contd.

7. Troops

(a) Morale ....

(b) Initiative ....

(c) Training ....

(d) Reaction to : Bayonet.......................Shelling..............................M.G......................

Rifle fire.......................Bombing..............................

(e) Efficiency ....

(f) Deserters ....

8. Distinguishing Signs—

(Badges) ....

9. Transport—

(a) Quantity and description ....

(b) Quality ....

10. Arms ....

Shew quality under Table 3, by putting G. (good), F. (fair), P. (poor), against each item.

11. Rations and Supplies ....

12. Location of Dumps ....

13. Equipment and Clothing ....

14. Gas and Anti-Gas ....

15. General ....

APPENDIX "D"

BATTALION INTELLIGENCE DIARY

SERIAL NUMBER.	T.O.R.	T.O.O.	FROM TIME.	INFORMATION.	ACTION TAKEN.	REMARKS AND DEDUCTIONS.
1/10	0230	0815	A Coy. 0810	7 prisoners captured by Patrol. One Lieut. and six O.R's from 3 Coy. 12 Bn.	Informed Bde. Arranged separate officer-men-docs.	
2/10	0842	0835	Bde. 0825	Tac/R. reports enemy M.T. arrived area MAGWE.	Arranged for patrol this area.	Possible attack this area?
3/10	0910	0900	B Coy. 0850	Enemy column approaching ROCKY HILL.	Warned A Coy.	
4/10	0930		Capt'd docs.	2 Bn. 15 Regt. opposite our posn.	Informed Bde., entered O of B book.	This bn. is specialist in night ops. Must warn all coys.

APPENDIX "E"

OBSERVATION POST LOG BOOK

This simple log has been designed for askaris of the intelligence section to keep up whilst on O.P. duty.

Four headings only are required :—

(NANI) WHO — Has made the report.
(LINI) WHEN — The report was made.
(GANI) WHAT — Action took place.
(WAPI) WHERE — The action took place.

No. 1 O.P. Log Book.

WHO	WHEN	WHAT	WHERE
Pte. Abdulla	1235	Enemy patrol, about 7 men, seen crossing "Clearing".	"Clearing" 500 yards in front of "A" Coy.
"	1305	8 Pl. finished digging and now in position.	Area Baobab tree.
"	1350	Enemy fighter plane crashed, no flames seen.	2000 yards right two o'clock, of No. 1. Op.

APPENDIX "F"

MILE.	ROAD WIDTH (in feet)	Can ground parallel to Road be used?	Type of surface (e.g. All—or Dry-weather; Tarmac, stone, sand, murrum)	Type of Bridge (e.g. Girder, Arch, etc., Steel, Stone or Wood).	Nature of abutments (e.g., Stone, concrete, Wood, etc.).	Road width on Bridge.	Wet-Gap of Bridge.	Number of spans.	Length of Longest Span.	SUPPLIES. WATER	REMARKS. GIVE ALL INFORMATION POSSIBLE, e.g., whether drainage needed, DEMOLITION POINTS, STEEP GRADIENTS, SHARP BENDS, COVER FROM THE AIR, etc.
1 GARISSA	50	Yes, for detours anywhere	Hard, sandy badly washed away.					—	—	Unlimited	GARISSA—LIBOI. Badly washed away for first 2 miles—thereafter flat, hard, sandy, a few washouts at approaches to culverts. Culverts themselves in good order. Deployment off road possible for M.T. on both sides. Thick, low bush — No adequate cover from air. No sharp bends. Requires grading and drainage. Landing grounds could be cleared, surface is suitable.
3	"										
4.6	"			Culvert	All culverts are standard corrugated iron and all are in good order.	50	3'				
6	"			"		"	"				
6.2	"			"		"	"				
20.1	"			"		"	"				
22.3	"			"		"	"				
			Bad Wash-out detour.	Series of Culverts.							
24.3				Culvert		"	"				
29.8	"		Embankment surface badly washed.	"		"	"				
30.8			Wash-out. Black cotton.	Culvert		"	"				
34.9	"		2 miles wash-out.								
35.3	"		Detour 100 yds.								
35.5											LIBOI—BELLES GUGANI. Road very cut up, water lying everywhere, requires grading and drainage. Narrow—no culverts. Cover from air in parts. Landing grounds could be made by clearing bush. Bush heavy, some large trees.
41.9	"		Detour 100 yds.	Culvert		"	"				
47.9	"			"		"	"				
53.5	"			"		"	"				
54.3	"			"							
118 LIBOI	30		Wash out. Sandy surface, water lying everywhere, very cut up.								
138.1	"										

APPENDIX "G"

RESOURCES OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES

POSSIBLE L.G's.	ACCOMMODATION. (a) Europn.	(b) African	UNDER-COVER STORAGE SPACE (with Dimensions)	LOCAL FOOD & INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES (incl. metal and standing timber).	INDUSTRIAL PLANTS AND REPAIR SHOPS (incl. POWER PLANTS).	LABOUR CIVILIAN (available)
Landing grounds could be made by clearing bush from GARISSA to BELLES GUGANI—Surface hard and sandy and level.	GARISSA Camping sites only.	Camping Sites only.	NIL	Cattle and Sheep unlimited. Bananas Eggs Milk Fruit Maize } limited at GARISSA.	NIL	Up to 150 at GARISSA at 3 days notice to D.C.

APPENDIX "H"

HEADINGS FOR RECONNAISSANCE REPORTS

The following are given as a guide to the points to be considered in furnishing reports :—

Aerodrome : (or Landing Ground)—Concealment from the air (e.g. proximity to rivers, roads or other prominent features); surface (nature, whether sufficiently level and firm, slope and drainage, estimate of work required to level or remove obstruction); area (clear run of 600 yards required in principal landing direction, which should preferably be that of the prevailing wind); shape (giving points of compass); air approaches and obstructions to landing and taking off (e.g. trees, telegraph wires, buildings); ground approaches (i.e. accessibility for M.T., etc.) and communications; accommodation for personnel; water supply; any special local meteorological conditions (e.g. prevailing wind, liability to mist or fog).

Armoured troops :—Nature of country (as affecting cross-country movement), obstacles (wood, streams, marshes, hedges,) defiles (including towns and villages), capacity of bridges, gradients, nature of soil, effect of rain; lying-up areas (capacity, concealment from air, protection); supplies of petrol and oil.

Attack :—Extent of enemy position, location, and strength of flanks; topographical weaknesses (e.g. defective field of fire, lack of depth, exposure to observation, etc.); enemy dispositions (guns, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, his facilities for observation, cover for reserves, likely positions for tanks, etc.); entrenchments and wire, obstacles; lines of attack most favourable to co-operation between the arms; forming up places; dead ground; observation posts; artillery positions; suitability of ground for tanks; best positions for headquarters and lines for signal communications; suitability of ground and roads for administrative arrangements, etc.

Billets :—Capacity of town or village for men, animals and vehicles; alternative approaches (to avoid congestion); water supply for men, watering places for animals; positions for headquarters; assembly places; cover from air observation; cover from bombardment (in cellars, etc.); parking places for armoured fighting vehicles, guns and vehicles.

Bivouac (or camping ground) :—Extent, nature of ground, shape, facilities for drainage, approaches, defensibility, cover from air observation, water supply, fuel, forage.

Bridge :—Material (steel, stone, brick, wood), span, number of arches or piers, dimensions, height above water, rail, or road, load taken, nature of river or stream (width, depth), materials available for repair, defensibility. (A figured hand-sketch is useful.)

Camp :—See Bivouac.

Canals :—Depth, width, nature of banks and of bottom; locks, bridges, suitable crossing places; boats or barges.

Country :—Flat, undulating, hilly, open or enclosed, cultivated or not; nature of soil; town, villages, farms, number of inhabitants; water supply; communications (railway, road, telegraph); defiles, river, streams, bridges; landmarks, observation points; supplies, forage, petrol, oil; suitability for movement of all arms (including armoured cars).

Defensive position :—Extent, depth, and nature; best positions for flanks; facilities for observation of enemy and concealment of own troops (including reserves); field of fire observation available for enemy; strong and weak points; facilities for surprise; covered ways within the position; advanced posts; artillery positions; ground suitable for tanks; nature of soil for entrenchment; natural obstacles especially against armoured fighting vehicles); wire and other materials available locally; villages and buildings and suitability for defence; covering or outpost position; best line for counter-attack; suitability of ground and roads for administrative arrangements; water supply, etc.

Defile :—Nature, whether commanded by neighbouring ground, length, width, ground on near and far side, positions for flanking parties, exposure to air attack.

Ford :—Depth, nature of bottom, distance across, whether straight or slanting, methods of making or recognizing ford, nature of banks, approaches, ground on either side, defensibility.

Landing ground :—See Aerodrome.

Observation post :—Nature (hill, tower, tree, haystack, building, etc.); extent of view (a panorama sketch may be useful), cover available, nature of approaches (i.e. road, path, etc.) and whether concealed or not.

Railway :—Gauge, number of lines, weight of rail, sleepers (wood or iron), nature of ballast; embankments, cuttings, tunnels, bridges, steep gradients; description of station; approaches and forming-up places (area, water supply, latrines and urinals, etc.), passenger and goods sidings (number, length, and road access), platforms (number, length, breadth, and height), number of end-loading and other ramps, facilities and area available for extension of station yard, goods sheds, engine sheds, locomotive turning arrangements; water supply; lighting arrangements; office accommodation, etc.

River :—Depth, width, current, nature of banks, nature of bottom, bridges, fords, ferries, facilities to swim horses, watering places, boats, material for rafts, liability to flood, etc.

Road :—Nature, condition of surface, width, metalling, steep gradients; bridges (load carried), suitability for M.T.; fenced or unfenced, nature of ground on either side; defiles; points of tactical importance; liability to traffic congestion, points where traffic control required, turning places or circuits for M.T.; exposure to air observation; places for watering men and animals; telegraph and telephone lines; proximity of materials for repair.

Station :—See Railway.

Towns or villages :—Length, width, shape, number of inhabitants; material of buildings; facilities for billeting; defensibility; water supply; means of lighting (electricity, gas, lamps); supplies of food, forage, oil, petrol; parking places, traffic control arrangements; local administration (names and addresses of chief functionaries, etc.).

Water supplies :—From stream, pond, or well; flowing or stagnant; yield in gallons an hour; number of animals that can drink at one time; fitness for men's drinking.

APPENDIX "I"

HINTS ON THE DRAWING OF MAPS, PLANS, DIAGRAMS FOR REPRODUCTION BY THE SURVEY SERVICE.

1. It frequently happens that the Survey Service is asked to reproduce in colour and quantity, maps, plans, diagrams, etc. It almost always happens that the above are required urgently, and they are nearly always drawn in such a way that they have to be re-drawn. As the Survey Service is always very busy, this means delay and disappointment. If the following simple rules are followed, most of this delay and disappointment will be overcome.

2. **Size of Job.** East African Survey printing presses are what is known as "Double Demy" size. Your job should therefore be within these limits of size, i.e. no work must be outside these limits :—

Double Demy. . . . . 35 inches by 24 inches.

3. **Material to draw on.** Draw your job on the best quality tracing paper, tracing linen, kodatrace or any other transparent material you can get. Do not draw on non-transparent drawing paper, as it can only be reproduced from it by using the camera, with the resultant delay.

4. **Reduction or Enlargement.** All work should be drawn the exact size you wish it to be produced. Any enlargement or reduction means using a camera with inevitable delay.

If you draw for reduction, you MUST make your writing large enough to be readable after reduction.

5. **Draughtsmanship.** Draw your job with good BLACK Indian ink. If your lines are weak and what is called "grey", on the original, they will appear even weaker on the answer.

You MUST produce clean tracings. All dirty marks will appear on the answer.

6. If your job is wanted only in one colour, draw in black, but if you want the answer in pink say so, but DON'T draw the original in pink. If you want your job in many colours, as is usual, first of all THINK like this :— In lithographic printing, every colour means a separate plate with a separate printing with certain delay. Can I therefore show what I want to show in BLACK only by using variations of black, i.e., dotted lines, chained dotted lines, circles, crosses; etc., etc. If you can do this—and you usually can—do so every time. The answer looks just as clear and it saves work and time.

If you must have the job in colours, draw your own original in all its colours and then draw each colour on a separate piece of tracing paper, in BLACK repeat BLACK. In order that the answer may fit properly, provide key marks, i.e., small crosses (usually grid corners) on each separate drawing, and state on each separate drawing what the final colour is to be. Before you send in your 4 or 5 separate drawings, superimpose them one upon another and make sure they fit. If they don't fit it is no use sending them in, as, without much extra work and delay, they cannot be made to fit. It helps if you provide one master copy in full colours, but it is not absolutely necessary for you to do so.

If you want your overprints to show up, it is a good plan to ask for your basic map to be printed in steel grey. If you want this done, ask for it.

7. **Checking Before Sending in.** Check your work carefully before you send it in. Alterations afterwards are annoying, and cause delay. If you spell "Fulfil" as "Fulfill" on your drawing, don't blame the Survey Service, if it comes out like that on the final answer.

8. **Proof Checking.** Say definitely if you wish a proof sent to you for checking or not. Normally, you will not be sent one unless you say so.

9. **Number of Copies Required and Where.** Don't forget to say how many copies you want, and get your answer right first time. It is no use coming back and saying: "I want

another 100 copies, as the Brigadier thought that the map was excellent." Survey will have washed off the plates, and will not be a bit cordial when you suggest they do it again, as this involves repeating the entire job. Don't forget to say where you want the job sent and by when. Don't say "as soon as possible". Fix a reasonable time and say what it is. Survey Service will either agree or state an alternative.

10. **To whom should you go to get the Job done.** Go to the Survey Directorate, H.Q. East Africa Command or to the Survey's representative (if there is one) at your H.Q. Do not tackle the E.A. Survey Group direct as they receive all work orders through Survey Directorate.



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Fig. 31.